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Conclusions
OUR examination has led to the conclusion that transportation of
more than local importance in the USSR is overwhelmingly supplied by
railroad. Our more detailed examination of the statistical record open
to us has, therefore, been confined to this form of transportation. We
have sought to appraise the rate of traffic growth and to ascertain in
a general way how this traffic growth has been accommodated through
the development of the railroad system and through the control of
railway operations. And we have sought by comparison of operating
statistics to understand Soviet rail operations sufficiently to satisfy
ourselves that, bearing in mind the bias in the data whose direction
is known, the reported traffic could reasonably be expected to be
handled with the plant and methods available.
The inquiry has led us through the toils of statistical manipulation,
changing coverage and definitions, reporting inadequacies, the absence
of conventional audit procedures, and the pressures on employees at
all levels to resort to misrepresentations. Yet we have concluded that,
when general allowances are made, the statistical record is reasonably
congruous and can be intçrpreted suitably for our purposes. The gen-
eral level of Soviet development, however, has compelled us to orient
our thinking to the first two decades of the present century in our own
railway development to find conditions more nearly comparable.
Even for this period, however, very significant differences must be
noted.
Whether considered in relation to land area, population, or traffic
volume, the Soviet rail network is small.It represents essentially a
planned system of main routes without competitive overlap and with
feeder lines developed sufficiently only to support major sources of
tonnage on a minimum basis. Its growth has been carefully controlled
and has been minor in comparison to the growth of traffic moved over
the system. Development since 1926 has, therefore, been intensive
and has centered on procuring as much transport service as possible
from the existing network, filling it out only in cases necessitated
by new industrial and agricultural development or where hauls could
be notably shortened by construction providing cutoffs between
existing segments of the system. Todegree unfamiliar in the West,
plant location has been forced to conform to the railway location,
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and agricultural areas have been forced to convey their output to
the rail system, usually by primitive means.
The growth of Soviet freight traffic has been very rapid; rates of
growth have been accomplished over, relatively long periods which
were equaled or approximated in the United States only during
several brie:E periods before 1900. The growth of rail traffic has been
more rapid than that of total traffic, as railroads have been required
to bear an increasing share of the demands made by the production
phases of the economy. Yet the Soviet Union was in the beginning so
ill provided with mechanized transport that this growth is measured
from a diminutive base. It is of importance that growth has continued
at a rapid since the recovery of the pre-Worid War II level, for
1940 affords a very substantial base from which to measure postwar
growth. Yet the rapidity of Soviet growth from 1926 to the present
leaves it still with only two-thirds the volume of intercity freight
transportation generated in the United States. And on a per capita
basis the Soviet provision of freight transportation is a still smaller
proportion of the U.S. level. The rapidity with which the volume of
freight transportation in the USSR has grown in relation to that in
the United States is, however, certainly of great significance. In 1928
the United States produced six times as much transport, in 1940 only
2.7 'timesmuch, and in 1959 only 1.5 times as much. Yet the U.S.
volume remains nearly 500 million ton-miles above the Soviet volume
in a year whose volume was adversely affected in the United States by
a prolonged steel strike and other adverse factors.
During the whole Soviet period freight transportation has never
been in abundant supply. Generally it has been tight, and agriculture
and industry have been forced to accommodate themselves to a
"tempo" of transport operation which seeks to secure a steady use of
plant and equipment throughout the year. Added tasks and expense
have, therefore, been thrown on other areas of the economy which
are rather consistently covered up.Nevertheless,it appears that
transportation has never been so serioUsly underprovided as to place
a noticeable restraint on the growth Of industrial output. The so-called
transportation crisis of the 1930's comes nearest to such a restraint
and was regarded as extremely serious. Requirements are not met
as promptly at any time as they are in the West, but in any given
year the economy's output tends to get mOved so that shortfalls of
production. are not readily traceable to failures of the transport system.
Over the period studied, it is likely' that the volume of freight
transportation generated affords a reasOnable quantitative measure
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of the total output of 'goods and of the movement of that output
from year to year. We may state• with considerable confidence that
the traffic data, both tons originated and tonkilometers, are over-
stated. We cannot measure the amount of thjs overstatement, but it
may easily come to as much as 10 per cent. In short, it is not insignifi-
cant and cannot, therefore, be ignored when using the Soviet data.
The composition of Soviet rail traffic also affords somewhat of an index
to the make-up of the Soviet economy. It is heavy in fuels, ores, pri-
mary materials, and basic construction materials.Itislight in
manufactured products, particulariy those representing the higher
stages of manufacture.
Soviet transport policy has manifestly sought to keep capital invest-
nient at a minimum and to sacrifice the quality of performance as
well as the inputs of fuel and labor to this objective. It has not been
as successful as the statistics would suggest, for not only is traffic over-
stated, but equipment is understated.Nevertheless, the utilization
secured from track, yards, motive power, and cars is very high, and
strenuous efforts are made to improve utilization through exhortation
and through a system of incentives and penalties based on efficiency
indexes, a practice almost unknown elsewhere in the railroad world.
While these practices invite misrepresentation atalllevels,they
certainly stimulate performance. Of greater importance to high utiliza-
tion, however, is the limitation of the plant and the restriction of
traffic to its confines. The traffic is virtually forced into a remarkably
even flow in which weekly and seasonal peaks come close to disappear.
ing. The service, moreover, is almost undifferentiated and both for
freight and passenger traffic the primitiveness of service is unmitigated
by any concessions to the needs or desires of shippers or travelers. No
period in our own transport history provides a reasonable comparison,
nor would such a period be expected to exist in a competitive system.
Soviet railway technology has remained primitive, although with
the rapid introduction of diesel power and the extension of electrifica-
tion, higher standards are swiftly being achieved. Except for occasional
modern intrusions upon a minor scale, in the prediesel period, we
must go back forty years in American railroad history for a comparison
that is moderately valid. Yet the lag of technology, on the average,
has, been no bar to a continuing increase in the capacity of the system
and we must bear in mind that the Soviet railroads today produce
half again as many ton-miles as the United States railroads. It would
be unfortunate to confuse obsolescence with a want of physical
capacity. There is, indeed, an argument to be made that the Soviet
135CONCLUSIONS
adjustment to its resources and skills has been a reasonably good one
over much of the period. It would appear that modernization is now
under way on a considerable scale and that the present program, if
fulfilled, will substantially transform the railroad system.It is sig-
nificant, however, that improved quality of the transport service is
not cited as a major objective of modernization. Instead, improved
technology, especially of motive power, is to be applied in order, to
attain a further expansion of capacity with a minimum capital
investment and without an unacceptable increase in fuel and man-
power inputs.
The sharpest contrast between Soviet and Western transport is in
the concentration of the Soviet Union on the railroad for both its
freight and passenger requirements. The United States since the
middle 1920's and Western Europe since the second war have developed
mainly by expanding the nonrail forms of transport. No counterpart
is observable in Soviet history.It is likely, indeed, that no major
nation has ever been so completely dependent on the railroad as the
Soviet Union is today. Since rail transportation in the United States
now accounts for less than 40 per cent of total intercity freight ton-
miles, itis essential to make comparisons of total intercity freight
transportation despite very serious statistical inadequacies in both
countries in much of the nonrail tr3nsport.Moreover, the virtual
absence of automobile transportation and the limited volume of
air transpo:rt must be kept in mind in evaluating a Soviet rail passenger
traffic one-half larger than all commercial intercity passenger mileage
in the United States, in addition to the fact that the railroad substitutes
for much transportation here performed by local and suburban bus
systems and by rapid transit lines.Even when suburban traffic is
excluded from the Soviet data, the rail passenger traffic still somewhat
exceeds the total of our rail, bus, and air passenger traffic excluding
commutation.
There is a rational explanation for the Soviet concentration on
rail transportation. The natural waterways of the Soviet Union which
are capable of improvement for navigation purposes do not mesh well
with the traffic flows required by the economy. Pipeline transportation
has been of limited usefulness because of the want of concentrated
flows which could fill large-diameter Hence neither of these
forms of transport could have been developed, althoUgh either might
prove more efficient than the railroad under certain circumstances.
Motor transport could be developed, except for local purposes,
because of the lack of an improved highway system. No importance
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has been attached to highway development, doubtless because it is
recognized that, by comparison with the railroad, truck or bus trans-
portation is highly inefficient except on the shortest hauls and requires
unacceptable inputs of fuel, labor, and repair parts, and a rate of
vehicle replacement which cannot be sustained without very massive
expansion of the automotive industry. Inability to secure from inland
and coastal waterways a service in the long-haul transport of bulk
commodities comparable to that performed in the United States,
together with the long distances separating important industrial and
resources concentrations, leads to an average haul for carriers other
than water greater than in the United States.The comparative
advantage of rail over motor transport increases rapidly with length
of haul and the confinement of motor transport development to the
very short hauls would seem to represent a decision favorable to the
minimization of resources devoted to transport.
The emphasis placed on heavy industry in the Soviet economy and
the lack of competitive distribution of consumer goods, even the lack
of large-scale distribution of such goods, also create a pattern of
traffic requirement capable of standardized handling in the mass and
without regard to special service considerations. These conditions
produce a climate highly favorable to the intensive utilization of the
limited railroad plant. When allowance is made for the certain bias
which overstates that utilization, we find no reason to suppose that
the Soviet rail system is in any respect incapable of the performance
which the traffic statistics—again allowing for bias—credit it with.
In short, Soviet rail output is explicable. Even in intensity of plant
and equipment, it nowhere exceeds numerous instances in this country
where sufficient traffic volume has permitted intensive utilization. Traf-
fic is spread much more evenly over the Soviet system and its flow is
subject to a degree of central control that is not sought or achieved
in a competitive system. Nor does the Soviet system carry the burden
of superfluous and light traffic mileage that is so characteristic of the
American system. Hence comparison of averages drawn from the
experience of the two countries is highly misleading and contributes
little to an understanding of the Soviet position.
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